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INVALIDATION OF RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR: OPPORTUNITIES FOR GENERAL
REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals must jump several major hurdles to earn the right to prac-
tice law. One hurdle state bars have traditionally imposed is the require-
ment that applicants demonstrate their residency in that state. This must
be done either upon application,1 prior to admission, or upon admission.
2
A residency requirement has been imposed on both applicants applying
for admission by examination,3 and attorney applicants admitted on mo-
tion without exam.4
Residency requirements have been common and long-standing,5 and
have prompted challenges on constitutional6 and pragmatic7 grounds for
1. See, e.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-16-2 (1987). The residency requirement com-
ponent was declared unconstitutional in Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners,
530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982) (mem.).
2. See, e.g., Wyo. Sup. CT. R. 5(c).
3. See, e.g., 40 IOWA CODE ANN. § 602 app. A, Rule 105.
4. See, e.g., ILL. Sup. CT. R. 705. See generally infra appendix and accompanying notes
(survey of residency and other requirements in 50 states and Washington, D.C.). Because
residency requirements prove most restrictive for attorney applicants with established prac-
tices elsewhere, this Note will concentrate on their plight.
5. Cf. Farley, Admission of Attorneys from Other Jurisdictions, in SURVEY OF THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION: REPORTS OF CONSULTANT AND THE ADVISORY AND EDITORIAL COMMITTEE ON
BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 152, 168 n.3 (R. Smith ed.
1952) (survey indicating only 10 states did not require residency of attorney applicants).
6. In 1798, Andrew Jackson and others petitioned against a Tennessee state law requir-
ing one-year residency within the state prior to bar admission, asserting that it was "incon-
sistent with the spirit of the federal constitution which declares that citizens of the United
States shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship in the several
states." Pratt, Book Review, 41 VAND. L. REV. 667, 671 (1988) (quoting J. ELY & T. BROWN,
LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON 102 (1987)). See generally Annotation, Validity and
Construction of Statutes or Rules Conditioning Right to Practice Law Upon Residence of
[sic] Citizenship, 53 A.L.R.3D 1163 (1973).
7. See, e.g., Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 272, 397
N.E.2d 1309, 1312-13, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (1979); Smith, Time for a National Practice of
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many years. Despite a flurry of academic" and judicial9 assaults on resi-
dency requirements in the 1970s, in that decade only four courts ruled
residency requirements unconstitutional."0 The Supreme Court of the
United States summarily affirmed"' or denied certiori1' in several cases
upholding residency barriers, supporting an inference that the Court
would not help eliminate the residency hurdle. 13
However, in deciding Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness in
1979, 14 the New York Court of Appeals opened the door for successful
challenges 5 based on the privileges and immunities clauses of the Consti-
tution."i The Supreme Court has since settled the residency issue, declar-
ing that the Constitution will not tolerate residency requirements, either
Law Act, 64 A.BA J. 557, 558 (1978); Comment, The Future of State Bar Residence Re-
quirements Under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, 26 S.D.L. REV. 79, 87 (1981).
8. See, e.g., Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements
Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1461
(1979) [hereinafter Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency Requirements];
Note, The Constitutionality of State Residency Requirements for Admission to the Bar, 71
MICH. L. REv. 838 (1973); Note, Durational Residence Requirements from Shapiro Through
Sosna" The Right to Travel Takes a New Turn, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 622 (1975).
9. E.g., Golden v. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 452 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Md. 1978); Wil-
son v. Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984 (D. Or. 1976), aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 925 (1977); Lipman v.
Van Zant, 329 F. Supp. 391 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F.
Supp. 1350 (E.D.N.C. 1970); Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641.
10. Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Haw., 332 F. Supp. 1392 (D.
Haw. 1971); Lipman, 329 F. Supp. 391 (invalidating one-year durational residency require-
ment, upholding 90-day requirement, against equal protection clause challenge); Keenan,
317 F. Supp. 1350; Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641.
11. Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984, aff'd mem., 430 U.S. 925 (1977); Brown v. Supreme Court
of Va., 359 F. Supp. 549 (E.D. Va.) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 1034 (1973); Suffling
v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257 (D.N.M.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Rose v. Bondurant, 409 U.S.
1020 (1972).
12. Aronson v. Ambrose, 479 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); Tang. v.
Appellate Div., 373 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 138 (2d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974).
13. See Canfield v. Wisconsin Bd. of Attorneys Professional Competence, 490 F. Supp.
1286, 1289-91 (W.D. Wis. 1980) (upholding privileges and immunities claim against resi-
dency requirement, citing summary affirmance of Wilson, 416 F. Supp. 984). But see Fusari
v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[T]he Court has not hesi-
tated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirmances may appear to have
established.").
14. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979) (rule making bar admission
contingent on actual residency for six months preceding application held to violate privi-
leges and immunities clause).
15. See, e.g., Helminski v. Supreme Court of Colo., 603 F. Supp. 401 (D. Colo. 1985);
Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982) (mem.);
Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (mem.); Noll v. Alaska Bar
Ass'n, 649 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1982); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980);
Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982).
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States").
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for those taking the bar exam, 1 or for those seeking admission to a state's
bar without exam on the basis of admission elsewhere.,
Invalidation of residency requirements pleases many practitioners in
today's environment of interstate practice,19 but arguably threatens the
independence and integrity of state bar associations.20 This Note exam-
ines the development and purposes of residency requirements, and the
effects of such barriers on lawyers and clients. It also reviews the two
Supreme Court decisions that declared residency barriers unconstitu-
tional.2 Further, this Note evaluates the efficacy of actual and potential
state responses to the abolition of residency requirements. An Appendix
lists pertinent court rules and statutes governing bar admission in the
fifty states and the District of Columbia, as published in the most recent
statutory and rules compilations available. The Appendix also summa-
rizes in chart form the laws regarding residency and other selected re-
quirements for bar admission.22
II. THE REQUIREMENT OF RESIDENCY
A. General Background and History
All states' 3 use three major types of requirements to ensure lawyer
competence: educational mandates, bar examinations, and moral charac-
ter standards.24 Most states require graduation from a law school ap-
17. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
18. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988).
19. A former American Bar Association president proposed a decade ago, that "[flt is in
the national interest and the interest of nationwide consumers of legal services that restric-
tive practices and state barriers be eliminated and interstate reciprocity [bar admission
without exam for licensed attorneys practicing elsewhere] be broadened." Smith, Time for a
National Practice of Law Act, 64 A.BA_ J. 557, 559 (1978); see P. Ross, THE CONSTITUTION-
ALITY OF STATE BAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS 2, 18 (1982); Bernstein, A Modest Proposal,
55 B. EXAMInER 10-11 (Aug. 1986); Salibra, Uniform Admissions: The Time Has Come, 54
B. EXAMINER 13-14 (Nov. 1985).
20. See Young, A National Bar? No!, 54 FLA. B.J. 109, 111-12 (1980) (national admission
standard would be insufficient to test local law and procedure knowledge, and would exces-
sively promote domination of practice by large and multistate firms); cf. Farley, supra note
5, at 167 (recommending residence not be required for longer than three months prior to
filing application or six months prior to admission date).
21. Many sources review constitutional jurisprudence as it applies to bar admissions.
See, e.g., P. Ross, supra note 19; Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Residency
Requirements, supra note 8; Special Project, Admission to the Bar: A Constitutional Anal-
ysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 655, 731-79 (1981); Annotation, Validity and Construction of Stat-
utes or Rules Conditioning Right to Practice Law Upon Residence of [sic] Citizenship, 53
A.L.R.3D 1163 (1973). Such detailed historical overview and analysis is beyond the scope of
this Note.
22. See infra appendix and accompanying notes.
23. "States," as used in this Note, includes the District of Columbia, but not the territo-
ries of the United States.
24. See A.B.A. Section of Legal Education and Admission to the Bar and the National
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proved by the American Bar Association,25 and several impose undergrad-
uate education standards.26 Nearly all state bars test applicants with
comprehensive exams on fundamental topics of interstate and local law.21
Some states allow admission by motion, without the standard exam, for
certain experienced practicing attorneys, judges or professors licensed
elsewhere.28 All states have long imposed moral character prerequisites,
albeit with shortcomings.29
States clearly have the duty and constitutional power to impose such
demands on persons seeking to practice law within their boundaries.2 0
The rationale for requiring residency, either prior to or concurrent with
admission,2" is less clear. 2 Nonetheless, residency requirements became
common.
23
Conference of Bar Examiners, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS
(1986) [hereinafter 1986 A.B.A. GUIDE].
25. E.g., Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.070; N.M. Sup. CT. R. 15-103(B); see Kirkwood, Requirements
for Admission to Practice Law, in SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: REPORTS OF CONSULT-
ANT AND THE ADVISORY AND EDITORIAL COMMITTEE ON BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 101 (R. Smith ed. 1952).
26. E.g., DEL. SUP. CT. R. 52 (a)(4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-10 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
27. E.g., DEL. Sup. CT. R. 52(a)(4); FLA. BAR EXAM R. art. 1, § 1; see A.B.A. Section of
Legal Education and Admission to the Bar and the National Conference of Bar Examiners,
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 14-21 (1988) [hereinafter 1988
A.BA. GUIDE].
28. E.g., MASS. SuP. JUD. CT. R. 3:01, § 6.1 (limited written exam in practice and proce-
dure required); N.C. R. GOVERNING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF L. § .0502; see 1988 ANBA
GUIDE, supra note 27, at 28-30; infra appendix and accompanying notes.
29. Rhode, Moral Character as a Professional Credential, 94 YALE L.J. 491, 497 & n.20
(1985).
30. See, e.g., Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154,
159 (1971); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
31. Compare 40 IOWA CODE ANN. § 602 app. A, Rule 105 (West 1988) (residency or bona
fide intention to become resident upon admission required of all applicants) and VA. SuP.
CT. R. 1A:1(c) (state high court must find applicant has become a permanent resident for
admission on motion) with Wyo. Sup. CT. R. 5(c) (six-month residency prior to application
required). Rules like those of Iowa and Virginia call for "simple" residency which is merely
residency at the time of application or admission. Rules like Wyoming's demand "dura-
tional" residency which is continued residency in the state for some period prior to applica-
tion or admission. See P. Ross, supra note 19, at 1; Comment, supra note 7, at 79-80.
32. Compare, e.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1985) (dis-
missing alleged purposes of residency requirements) and Note, A Constitutional Analysis of
State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 8, at 1489 (also dismissing alleged purposes
of residency requirements) with Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1985) (residency
facilitates knowledge of state's law and practice), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986) and
Suffling v. Bondurant, 339 F. Supp. 257, 260 (D.N.M.) (six-month durational prior residency
requirement held a reasonable period for morals investigation), aff'd mem. sub. nom. Rose v.
Bondurant, 409 U.S. 1020 (1972) and Young, supra note 20, at 110 (implying practice re-
strictions serve legitimate goal of controlling local economic conditions).
33. See 1986 A.B.A. GUIDE, supra note 24, at 28-30 (30 states retained residency require-
ments for attorney applicants in 1986); Farley, supra note 5.
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B. Effects of Residency Requirements
Whatever the asserted goals and benefits of residency requirements,
their most noticeable effects are economic.3 4 There are at least three prin-
cipal groups of lawyers aggrieved by residence requirements: those admit-
ted to practice in one state who desire to practice elsewhere; lawyers
planning to specialize and engage in multistate practice elsewhere; and
corporate lawyers subject to frequent relocation.3 5 At least one student
commentator would add another group, new graduates hoping to practice
in a state other than the one they resided in during law school.3 6
Durational residence requirements pose formidable barriers for attor-
neys licensed elsewhere. Under the New York rule voided in Gordon v.
Committee on Character & Fitness,37 for example, an attorney had to
give up his or her residence and occupation for at least six months."' A
rule which forces veteran attorneys to relinquish practice 9 inflates legal
service costs and does a disservice to consumers.4 In-house corporate
counselors may be in the worst position because they must often move as
their employers dictate.
41
Lawyers have an important role in daily commerce 42 and practice limi-
tations such as residency requirements frustrate expansion of the inter-
state practice of law.43 The New Jersey Supreme Court foreshadowed the
demand for freer multistate practice rules over twenty years ago, in Ap-
34. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 279, 285 n.18 (1985) ("Many of the states
that have erected fences against out-of-state lawyers have done so primarily to protect their
own lawyers from professional competition." (quoting Smith, supra note 19, at 557)); see
also Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 1985).
35. Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 272, 397 N.E.2d 1309,
1312-13, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641, 645 (1979).
36. Comment, supra note 7, at 87.
37. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
38. Id. at 272, 397 N.E.2d at 1312, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
39. In limited situations, lawyers could move to the jurisdiction where the durational
mandate exists, and continue to practice in the state where they are licensed, because state
bars have virtually never imposed continuing residency requirements. See Hafter, Toward
the Multistate Practice of Law Through Admission by Reciprocity, 53 Miss. L.J. 1, 33 n.17
(1983).
40. A peculiar alliance formed between consumer activist Ralph Nader's Public Citizen
Litigation Group and lawyers arguing for rules facilitating interstate practice, "because iron-
ically, in this instance the corporations were consumers." Salibra, supra note 19, at 14.
41. Id. at 13. In arguing for a substantially nationalized admission standard, Salibra
complains that dealing with differences in substantive law among the states is less onerous
for attorney and client than the administrative morass of gaining access to state courts. Id.
42. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975).
43. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 449 n.8 (1979) (per curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(quoting Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 699,
699-700 (1975)); P. Ross, supra note 19, at 2.
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pell v. Reiner."' The court in Appell reversed and remanded a lower court
decision that a mortgage note was invalid because it was negotiated by a
New York attorney who was not a member of the New Jersey bar. Al-
though acknowledging the "general controlling principle" that transac-
tions made for New Jersey residents under New Jersey law must be fur-
nished by New Jersey counselors, the court noted:
We nevertheless recognize that there are unusual situations in which a strict
adherence to such a thesis is not in the public interest. In this connection
recognition must be given to the numerous multistate transactions arising in
modern times. This is particularly true ... in the midst of the financial and
manufacturing center of the nation .... An inflexible observance of the
general controlling doctrine may well occasion a result detrimental to the
public interest, and it follows that there may be instances justifying such
exceptional treatment warranting the ignoring of state lines. 5
Demographics indicate that residency requirements ignore economic re-
alities. As of 1980, there were forty-one standard metropolitan statistical
areas ("SMSAs"), as defined by the Census Bureau, covering contiguous
geographic areas in two or more states.4 6 Besides representing a large
share of the nation's general population and commercial centers, the SM-
SAs were home to an estimated 138,087 lawyers.17 This represents
twenty-five percent of the estimated 542,205 lawyers nationwide.48
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. Piper and Friedman: The One-Two Combination
If Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness"' opened the door to
the constitutional rejection of residency requirements," the Supreme
Court gave New York's high court the key with Hicklin v. Orbeck,5' a
privileges and immunities clause52 case. The privileges and immunities
clause aims to place "the citizens of each State upon the same footing
with citizens of other states, so far as the advantages resulting from citi-
zenship in those States is concerned."5 " The privileges and immunities
44. 43 N.J. 313, 204 A.2d 146 (1964).
45. Id. at -, 204 A.2d at 148.
46. American Bar Foundation, THE LAWYER STATISTIcAL REPORT- A STATISTIcAL PROFILE
OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980s 547 (B. Curran ed. 1985) [hereinafter LAWYER
STATISTIcAL REPORT].
47. See id. at 547-68.
48. Id. at 565.
49. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
50. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
51. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
52. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
53. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
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clause is implicated whenever states, without substantial justification,"
discriminate against nonresidents in the exercise of certain important in-
dividual rights.5
In Hicklin, the Court clarified that a state must pass two tests to jus-
tify discriminatory treatment under the privilege and immunities clause.56
States must show that nonresidents contribute substantially to the prob-
lem the discriminatory state action attempts to alleviate, and show that
the action bears a close relationship to a substantial state interest.57 The
Hicklin opinion implied that the availability of less restrictive alterna-
tives to protect the state's interest is probative and harms the state's
case.5 1 This revitalized privileges and immunities clause doctrine set the
stage for the two cases in which the Court squarely addressed bar admis-
sion requirements.
The facts involved in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper5 9
were simple. Piper, who lived 400 yards from the New Hampshire border,
in Vermont, applied to take the New Hampshire bar exam.6 0 She stated
in her application her intent to become a New Hampshire resident, and
passed the bar's character scrutiny and examination.6 1 The New Hamp-
shire Board of Bar Examiners, citing New Hampshire Supreme Court
Rule 42, notified her that she had to establish a home address in that
state before admission would be granted.2 She informed the board she
had decided to stay in Vermont for personal and financial reasons and
sought an exception to the rule. 3 The exception was denied, and Piper
filed suit in federal court, challenging the rule on constitutional grounds.6
The district court held that the practice of law was a fundamental right
protected by the privileges and immunities clause. It found that Rule 42
denied Piper this right without substantial reason, and that the rule was
not closely tailored to its intended goals. The district court thus con-
54. See, e.g., Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
55. These include professional pursuits important to the national economy, including the
practice of law. E.g., Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1985); Gordon v.
Committee on Character & Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 272, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1312, 422
N.Y.S.2d 641, 644-45 (1979).
56. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525-26. The Supreme Court had previously articulated the tests,
but it was not clear that each test represented a separate hurdle. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at
396.
57. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 525-26. Economic protectionism, a state's desire to insulate resi-
dent businesses from nonresident business competitors, does not represent a "substantial"
state interest justifying discriminatory treatment. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 285 n.18.
58. Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 528.
59. 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
60. Id. at 275-76.
61. Id. at 276.
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cluded that Rule 42 violated the privileges and immunities clause. 5
The Supreme Court began its review with a brief history of the privi-
leges and immunities clause and explained that the practice of law falls
within the ambit of the clause. The Court found it significant that law-
yers play important roles in national commerce and as champions of un-
popular causes and federal rights.
6 6
The Court rejected the appellant's assertion that lawyers are so impor-
tant to state judicial authority that their regulation falls within the "po-
litical rights" exception to the privileges and immunities clause.6 7 Relying
principally on In re Griffiths,"' the Court concluded that the political
rights exception was unwarranted, and the practice of law was thus a
right protected by the privileges and immunities clause. 9
The Court next considered New Hampshire's justifications for refusing
to admit nonresidents into the bar. The state asserted that nonresidents
would be less likely than residents to: gain and maintain familiarity with
local rules and procedures, behave ethically, be available for unexpected
court proceedings, or do pro bono and similar public service work in the
state.7° The Court proclaimed these assertions insufficient to establish a
substantial reason for excluding nonresidents and further stated that ex-
clusion of residents did not bear a substantial relationship to such goals.71
In addition, the Court commented that Rule 42 was "markedly overinclu-
sive," and suggested mandatory attendance at state practice seminars as a
less restrictive alternative for maintaining attorney competency.72 Be-
cause New Hampshire permitted established bar members to move out of
state without losing their membership, Rule 42 was also underinclusive.73
65. Id. at 277; see Piper v. Supreme Court of N.H., 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982).
66. Piper, 470 U.S. at 281 (citing Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788
(1975), and Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 450 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
67. Id. at 283. The Court has long recognized states' independence in controlling activi-
ties directly related to their sovereignty as separate political bodies. See, e.g., Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (upholding 30-day residency requirement, but not one-year,
for right to vote in state election); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.) (seven-
year residency requirement upheld for candidates for governor), aff'd mem., 414 U.S. 802
(1973).
68. 413 U.S. 717 (1973) (rejecting the same political rights argument made in Piper, and
holding that exclusions of aliens from a state's bar violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment).
69. Piper, 470 U.S. at 283.
70. Id. at 285.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 285 n.19. At least 30 states have some continuing legal education requirement
for active bar members. See VA. Sup. CT. R. Pt. 6, § IV, para. 17; 1988 A.BA. GUIDE, supra
note 27, at 40-41.
73. Piper, 470 U.S. at 285 n.19. Other courts have criticized this seeming inconsistency.




The Court found no evidence or logic to support New Hampshire's
claim that nonresidents would be unfamiliar with local procedure or be-
have unethically.7 4 Addressing the latter matter, the Court observed that
states may and do discipline nonresident lawyers for unethical conduct.1
The Court found more merit to the argument that nonresidents are
more likely than residents to be unavailable for court proceedings, but
found the concern insubstantial.7 6 Proper scheduling and the use of con-
ference telephone calls for minor judicial proceedings reduce the risk of
unavailability.77 Lawyers who were willing to take the New Hampshire
bar exam and pay annual bar dues would be expected to live close to the
state anyway, the Court surmised.7 8 Further, trial courts could control the
problem by imposing rules or discretionary orders requiring that lawyers
residing far from court must retain local counsel, available for un-
scheduled meetings and hearings.
79
The New Hampshire Supreme Court's final argument, that nonresi-
dents would not be inclined to do pro bono work, conflicted with the
Court's "reasonable" belief that "most lawyers who become members of a
state bar will endeavor to perform their share of these services."' 0 The
Court mentioned the alternative of requiring all bar members to do pro
bono service."" The Court thus held that the New Hampshire residency
requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause.82
Justice Rehnquist based his dissent principally on two factors: a more
traditional view of lawyers as officers of the state, 3 and disdain for the
Court's emphasis on means analysis and the availability of less restrictive
alternatives.8 His reasonable views on legal traditions and judicial review
failed to mask a distasteful implication that insular economic protection-
ism for lawyers is justified. 5
74. Piper, 470 U.S. at 285-86.
75. Id. at 286 & n.20. Several states have disciplinary rules asserting jurisdiction over
nonresidents, or ensuring jurisdiction, by requiring nonresidents to designate an in-state
agent for service of process. See, e.g., 40 IOWA CODE ANN. § 602 app. A, Rule 105 (West
1988); N.J. CT. R. 1:21-1; WASH. R.L.D. 1.2; infra appendix and accompanying notes.
76. Piper, 470 U.S. at 286.
77. See id. at 286 & n.21.
78. Id. at 286-87.
79. Id. at 287.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 287 & n.22. The Court did not address the potential constitutional challenges
to such schemes. See Cunningham v. Superior Court of Ventura County, 177 Cal. App. 3d
336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).
82. Piper, 470 U.S. at 288.
83. Id. at 289-93 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 294-95.
85. "Since at any given time within a State there is only enough legal work to support a
certain number of lawyers, each out-of-state lawyer who is allowed to practice necessarily
takes legal work that could support an in-state lawyer. . . ." Id. at 292-93. This state goal
1989]
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The Court's decision in Piper took the "residents only" sign off the
door to bar admissions, but it took a challenge to a Virginia rule to take
the door off its hinges. The Court in Piper affirmed the unconstitutional-
ity of residency requirements for taking a bar exam. Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Friedman"" extended that holding to compulsory residency for
attorney applicants admitted by motion, without examination. s7
Under Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1A:1, certain attorneys admit-
ted to practice before the highest court in other American jurisdictions
may apply to join the Virginia bar if the place where they are currently
licensed allows admission on motion."" Applicants must file an official ap-
plication with the Supreme Court of Virginia and submit a certificate
signed by the presiding judge of the high court where they are entitled to
practice stating that the license has been in effect for at least five years.8 9
They must also furnish a National Conference of Bar Examiners report 0
concerning their past practice and record.9 1 Upon paying a fifty dollar
filing fee, the attorney applicant may gain admission by motion of an ex-
isting Virginia bar member, provided the Supreme Court of Virginia finds
the applicant: is "a proper person to practice law," has made such pro-
gress in legal practice as to make an exam requirement unreasonable, has
"become a permanent resident of the Commonwealth," and intends to
practice full-time as a Virginia bar member.2 The court may revoke a
license granted under this rule if it finds the licensee no longer satisfies
the residency or full-time practice requirements.9"
A veteran attorney, who joined the Illinois bar by examination in 1977
and the District of Columbia bar by reciprocity in 1980 challenged the
residency clause Supreme Court of Virginia Rule 1A:1. She worked as an
attorney for the United States Navy from 1977 to 1981, and entered pri-
vate practice in Washington, D.C., in 1982. In January of 1986, she be-
came associate general counsel for a corporation based in Vienna, Vir-
ginia.94 One month later, she married and moved to her husband's home
does not represent a substantial state interest, for purposes of privileges and immunities
clause analysis. See supra note 57.
86. 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988).
87. Id. at 2267.
88. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:1. Such practice is commonly called "admission by reciprocity," or
"admission by comity." See Hafter, supra note 39, at 4.
89. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:1(1), (2).
90. The report employs the nationwide investigative powers of the national conference,
and is required of attorney applicants by many states. See Merritt, The National Confer-
ence of Bar Examiners, in SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: REPORTS OF CONSULTANT AND
THE ADVISORY AND EDITORIAL COMMITTEE ON BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR AD-
MISSION TO THE BAR 462, 477-86 (R. Smith ed. 1952).
91. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:1(3).
92. Id. R. 1A:1(4)(a)-(c).
93. Id. R. 1A:3.
94. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2262.
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in Maryland. In June of 1986, she applied for admission by motion to the
Virginia Bar.95
Friedman acknowledged in her complaint that she did not live in Vir-
ginia. She assured the Clerk of the Supreme Court of Virginia that she
met all other requirements of Rule 1A:1. Friedman asserted there was "no
reason to discriminate against [her] ... petition as a nonresident," citing
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper as controlling.9" The clerk
denied Friedman's request. He explained that the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia believed Piper did not apply to the "discretionary requirement in
Rule 1A:1 of residence as a condition of admission by reciprocity. 9 7
Friedman challenged the residency requirement in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. She obtained summary
judgment on the grounds that the requirement violated the privileges and
immunities clause.98 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit unani-
mously affirmed.99
The Supreme Court of Virginia claimed that the discretionary admis-
sion provided for by Rule 1A:1 was not a protected right under the privi-
leges and immunities clause. It argued that the bar examination serves as
an adequate alternative route to bar admission. 100 The Supreme Court of
Virginia also noted that it could permissibly require all bar applicants to
pass an examination.""1 The Supreme Court of the United States found
neither argument persuasive. 0 2
The Court read Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper to impli-
cate the privileges and immunities clause whenever "a State does not per-
mit qualified nonresidents to practice law within its borders on terms of
substantial equality with its own residents.'1 0 3 The availability of admis-
95. Id. at 2262-63.
96. Id. at 2263.
97. Id. The clerk's response represents either a syntax error or a misguided Supreme
Court of Virginia judgment, because Virginia's reciprocity rule requires that residency and
other standards be "determined favorably for the applicant" before admission by motion is
allowed. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:1.
98. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2263. The district court did not address allegations that
residency requirements violate the commerce clause or equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, and neither the court of appeals nor the Supreme Court considered such
questions. Id.
99. Id.; see Friedman v. Supreme Court of Va., 822 F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1987).
100. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2264.
101. Id. at 2264-65. A similar argument, that admission by motion for residents repre-
sents permissible favor for certain new residents, rather than impermissible penalties
against nonresidents, persuaded the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold an Illinois
bar rule like Virginia's Rule 1A:1. Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1086 (1986). The Seventh Circuit also rejected commerce clause and equal
protection challenges to the Illinois scheme. Id. at 661-63.
102. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2265.
103. Id. at 2265.
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sion by examination was unimportant because, even where such discrimi-
nation does not totally exclude nonresidents from the state, the privileges
and immunities clause may reach discrimination against them."" Even
the residency rule struck down in Piper, the Court noted, did not totally
exclude nonresidents from practicing law in the state.'0 5
The Court viewed the Supreme Court of Virginia's second argument as
irrelevant. "A State's abstract authority to require from resident and non-
resident alike that which it has chosen to demand from the nonresident
alone has never been held to shield the discriminatory distinction from
the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause."'106 Concluding that
Rule 1A:1 burdens a protected privileges and immunities clause right
solely on the basis of residency, 10 7 the Court next considered Virginia's
justifications for the rule.
The Supreme Court of Virginia claimed that residency, in tandem with
the full-time practice requirement, 08 assured that attorneys admitted on
motion would be as committed to service and knowledge of Virginia law
as those admitted by examination.0 9 The Supreme Court of the United
States acknowledged that the solemnity and difficulty of examination
helps assure knowledge and commitment, but remained unconvinced that
nonresident attorney applicants on motion would be less committed than
residents applying the same way. "[I]t does not follow that when the
State waives the examination it may make a distinction between residents
and nonresidents," the Court opined."'
Virginia requires that all attorneys admitted on motion show an intent
to maintain an office and regular practice in the state."' This alone effec-
tively ensures that attorneys admitted on motion, residents or not, will
have a substantial stake in the practice of law in Virginia and a concomi-
tant devotion to integrity, service and knowledge."' As it did in Piper,
the Court suggested that mandatory continuing legal education"13 and
104. Id.
105. Id. New Hampshire allows pro hac vice appearances in its courts, by persons not
members of its bar, at the trial court's discretion, if the moving attorney affiliates with a
member of the New Hampshire Bar. See Piper, 470 U.S. at 277 n.2; accord, LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 37:214 (West 1988); N.J. CT. R. 1:21-1; VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A.4. The right to appear pro
hac vice under most systems is not a cognizable property interest within the terms of the
fourteenth amendment due process clause. See Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 443-44 (1979)
(per curiam).
106. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2265.
107. Id.
108. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:l(d).
109. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2266.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing Application of Brown, 213 Va. 282, 286 n.3, 191 S.E.2d 812, 815 n.3
(1972)).
112. See id.
113. The Court apparently was not aware of Virginia's existing continuing education pro-
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mandatory indigent service plans were constitutional alternatives to
residency.1
14
Similar analysis supported the Court's rejection of Virginia's argument
that residency facilitates enforcement of the full-time practice require-
ment of Rule 1A:1. "The office requirement furnishes an alternative to
the residency requirement that is not only less restrictive, but also is fully
adequate to protect whatever interest the State might have in the full-
time practice restriction." 115
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in an opinion joined by Justice Scalia, dis-
sented."1 Chief Justice Rehnquist repeated the grounds for the objection
he raised in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper.1 7 He also
showed sympathy for Virginia's assertion" 8 that admission by motion
should not fall under the rights protected by the privileges and immuni-
ties clause."'
Chief Justice Rehnquist characterized admission on motion as "an
ameliorative provision, recognizing the fact that previous practice in an-
other State may qualify a new resident of Virginia to practice there with-
out the necessity of taking another bar examination."'I2 He noted that
twenty-eight states presently do not allow reciprocal admission on mo-
tion,' 2 ' and expressed concern that Virginia might join the trend' 22 to-
ward requiring examination of all applicants."3
gram. See VA. Sup. CT. R. pt. 6, § IV, para. 17.
114. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2267.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 2267-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
117. 470 U.S. 275, 289-97 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
118. See Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2264-65; supra note 101.
119. Id. at 2267 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
120. Id. Note that this still begs the question. It assumes new residents are more qualified
than nonresidents to practice in Virginia without an exam.
121. Id. at 2268, n.***. Even acknowledging that Chief Justice Rehnquist may have access
to amendments of state court rules unavailable to this author, his note deserves clarification.
First, five of the states he lists, California, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mississippi and North
Dakota, generally require qualified attorney applicants to take only limited "attorney's ex-
ams" in court procedures. Another state he lists, North Carolina, requires only a recent
passing score on the MPRE. Montana and Rhode Island, also listed, both allowed admission
by reciprocity, according to latest rules published in code compilations; because each also
maintained a residency requirement for admission by motion, they may have joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist's list since then. See infra appendix and accompanying notes; see also
1988 A.BA GUIDE, supra note 27, at 29.
122. Cf. Farley, supra note 5, at 157 (11 of 48 states required exams of attorney appli-
cants in 1952).
123. See Friedman, 108 S. Ct. at 2268 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This fear reflects
Chief Justice Rehnquist's assertion, implied in his Piper dissent, that state bars deliberately
seek to insulate their established resident memberships from the threat of outside competi-
tion. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. As the Chief Justice's Friedman dissent
points out, the unconstitutional Virginia rule is more accommodating to certain attorney
2431989]
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B. Residency and Other Requirements After the Knockout
The rapid and recent assault on residency requirements brought rapid
change to states' bar admission rules. A 1952 survey found residency re-
quired of attorney applicants in all but ten jurisdictions: Washington,
D.C., Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Montana and Ohio."" Eleven states required examination of
attorney applicants.'25 By 1984, residency restrictions confronted attorney
applicants in twenty-three of the thirty-one states (including the District
of Columbia) that allowed admission on motion.'26 A total of twenty-eight
states required residency for admission by exam. 127 By 1986, the decision
in Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper reduced the number of
states retaining residency requirements for admission by exam to six."18
Thirty states allowed admission by motion.'29
The most recent statutory and rule compilations regarding bar require-
ments indicate that twenty-nine states now allow admission on motion.30
Nine of these states effectively imposed residency requirements on such
admissions.131 Nonresident bar applicants in eleven states must now
maintain an in-state office, or designate an in-state agent for purposes of
applicants than the constitutional alternative requiring exams of all applicants. See Fried-
man, 108 S. Ct. at 2267-68. He fails, however, to address the critical issue under the privi-
leges and immunities clause: whether attorney applicants who do not intend to reside in the
Commonwealth are a peculiar source of some state problem, such that they should be re-
quired to take a full bar exam, while residents who have practiced elsewhere receive an
exam waiver.
As this Note argues, states need not react as defensively as Chief Justice Rehnquist fears
they will, particularly if a healthy bar and well-served legal clients are the states' goals.
Legislators and bar leaders should also consider that what is good for some resident attor-
neys is not necessarily good for the state's overall economy. For example, a Texas corpora-
tion could be deterred from moving its corporate headquarters to Virginia if it knows it
must obtain new counsel for its complicated interstate legal work, and is satisfied with its
current provider. Cf. Salibra, supra note 19, at 13-14 (effective corporate representation is
severely impeded by state practice restrictions); Farley, supra note 5, at 151
("[R]equirements which serve only to protect local lawyers from competition . . can not be
justified. They constitute barriers which should be abolished for the good of the
profession.").
124. Farley, supra note 5, at 152, 168 n.3.
125. Id. at 157.
126. See Ashman, New Hampshire's Not So Simple Residence Requirements: The Piper
Opinions, 53 B. EXAMINER 24-26 (survey and commentary by executive director of the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners, pending Supreme Court appeal of Piper).
127. Id.
128. See 1986 A.B.A. GUIDE, supra note 24, at 2-4. The Piper decision of course invali-
dated such rules.
129. Id. at 28-30.
130. See supra note 121; infra appendix and accompanying notes.
131. See infra appendix and accompanying notes. Again, these rules are void under the
decision in Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260 (1988).
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service of process, or both.'32
IV. AFTER Piper AND Friedman: EVALUATING ALTERNATIVES TO
RESIDENCY
Courts and commentators have offered many alternatives to residency
requirements' 33 to uphold the integrity of state bars without impeding
access to the courts by nonresident attorneys." This section will evaluate
the viability of such options, in light of administrative constraints and the
growing demand for multistate and interstate legal services. Opportuni-
ties for reform in Virginia will receive special attention.
A. The Blanket Exam Requirement
Virginia may choose to repeal admission on motion altogether, forcing
all attorney applicants to take the bar examination, and thus fulfill Chief
Justice Rehnquist's prophecy. 35 Several factors argue against such a
move.
First, examination is somewhat redundant because Virginia, like virtu-
ally all other states, makes the Multistate Bar Examination of the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners a major component of its exam pro-
cess.136 Full examination also would deter an older lawyer more than a
younger one. Younger attorneys, who have done less to prove their com-
petency, would perform better on examinations simply because the
broad-based concepts tested are fresher in their minds. 37 In this way,
examination may hinder the availability of skilled and competent lawyers
for Virginia clients, which is the result residency requirements were al-
leged to promote.
The inherent implication of reciprocal motion systems is that exper-
132. See infra appendix and accompanying notes.
133. E.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260, 2266-67 (1988); Supreme
Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285-87 (1985); Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar
Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155, 160 (D.S.D. 1982) (mem.); Note, A Constitutional Analysis of
State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 8, at 1488-89.
134. The proposals considered here could generally apply to residents and nonresidents,
as well as attorney applicants and applicants for admission by examination.
135. Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260, 2268 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
136. See 1988 A.B.A. GUIDE, supra note 27, at 14-17, 21. The only states which do not
administer the Multistate Bar Examination are Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, and Washington.
Id.
137. See Smith, supra note 19, at 558; cf. Brenner, Consultant's Report, in SURVEY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION: REPORTS OF CONSULTANT AND THE ADVISORY AND EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
ON BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR, 145 (R. Smith ed.
1952) (chart indicating passing percentages for first time examination takers declines with
age).
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ienced attorneys in good standing elsewhere have demonstrated the gen-
eral legal competency which testing measures in new law school graduates
and inexperienced attorney applicants. 13s The traditional justification for
examining attorney applicants is that each state has unique laws.' Vir-
ginia, however, has adopted nationally known uniform laws covering more
than fifty topics.14 These include commercial law,14 disposition of princi-
pal and income from estates, 42 and transfer of assets to minors.4" Vir-
ginia could effectively test knowledge of its unique laws and court proce-
dures by using limited "attorney's exams," used in at least five other
states."'
Finally, Virginia and other states with unconstitutional residency re-
quirements for reciprocal motion should consider the legal challenges to a
decision eliminating reciprocity. Repeal motivated by economic protec-
tion of the local bar may be actionable under federal antitrust laws.' 5
B. Modifying Reciprocity to Meet Valid Concerns
The invalidation of the residency requirement for attorneys admitted
on motion is unlikely to prompt a sudden flood of nonresident attorney
applicants.14 Over eighty percent of the nation's lawyers work in solo
138. See Hafter, supra note 39, at 42.
139. See Farley, supra note 5, at 167; cf. Hafter, supra note 39, at 9 (exam requirement
retains viability in Louisiana, where domestic law stems from the Napoleonic Code).
140. See 14 VA. CODE ANN. at 908-10 (Repl. Vol. 1988) (index of uniform law topics).
141. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.1-101 to 8.11-108 (1965 & Cum. Supp. 1988).
142. Id. §§ 55-253 to -268 (Repl. Vol. 1986).
143. Id. §§ 31-37 to -59 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
144. See supra note 121; infra appendix and accompanying notes. The Commonwealth
may be peculiarly justified in examining all attorney applicants for knowledge of state court
rules and procedure. For example, Virginia has not followed the state court trend of basing
its evidence and civil procedure rules on federal rules.
Another alternative to requiring full examination of all attorney applicants is to adopt a
special, limited-practice licensing scheme. Under this approach, attorneys with good stand-
ing elsewhere may handle specific matters for one or more clients, whether or not the matter
involves court appearances. Morris, State Borders: Unnecessary Barriers to Effective Law
Practice, 53 A.B.A. J. 530, 531 (1967). Such a system may resemble an expanded pro hac
vice procedure, limiting practice to attorney applicants associated with local counsel. See id.
It could also expand upon the limited bar memberships conditioned on type of client or
practice. See, e.g., Ky. Sup. CT. R. 2.111 (limited practice certificate for lawyers employed
full-time by firms doing business in Kentucky); VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:2 (certain foreign patent
and trademark attorneys admitted to practice in those specific areas, without examination
or residency requirements).
145. Hafter, supra note 39, at 38 n.130.
146. A reciprocity advocate acknowledges that admission statistics in the District of Co-
lumbia, once the sole American jurisdiction with reciprocity and no residency strings, sug-
gests otherwise. Hafter, supra note 39, at 37-38. The district is an anomaly, however. Among
its more than 25,000 resident attorneys, for example, over 57% work for the federal or city
government, or for corporations or associations with important lobby interests in the na-
tion's capital. LAWYER STATISTIcAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 92-93. Many of Washington's
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practice or in firms with fewer than ten attorneys,14 7 and only two percent
of all firms have offices in more than two communities. 148 It remains un-
economical for most lawyers to pay annual bar dues in a distant state
where they do not maintain a regular practice. Virginia's in-state office
and full-time practice requirements add to the practical barriers for out-
of-state attorneys.'48
However, some increase in the number of attorney applicants is likely.
One or more of the following Virginia bar reforms should ensure attorney
competency and availability for court proceedings.
1. More Effective and Extensive Character Investigation
Existing Virginia rules require attorney applicants to submit a National
Conference of Bar Examiners report on past practice. 50 This is an effec-
tive use of Virginia bar resources, and offers an adequate review of an
attorney applicant's fitness and moral character.' 5' Those not seeking
Virginia bar admission on motion should also be subject to more exten-
sive background and character investigations' if the Virginia General
Assembly and Supreme Court of Virginia continue to believe moral char-
acter checks can weed out bad attorneys.
2. Expanded Continuing Legal Education Requirements
Continuing legal education ("CLE") requirements force all attorneys to
nearly 10,000 resident private practitioners, as well as nonresidents who practice there, also
are presumably attracted by federal government interests and administrative law.
147. LAWYER STATISTicAL REPORT, supra note 46, at 66.
148. Id. at 53. It is also worth noting that 14.8% of lawyers living in Virginia are admitted
to practice in other jurisdictions, but not Virginia. Id. at 206. This far exceeds the 6.5%
national average for this phenomenon. Id. at 65.
149. In a case involving solely the Supreme Court of the United States' supervisory au-
thority over federal district court rulemaking, the Supreme Court called residency and in-
district office requirements "unnecessary and irrational." Frazier v. Heebe, 107 S. Ct. 2607,
2613 (1987). Dicta in Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman suggests that the Court would not
be so harsh toward state bars requiring in-state offices. See 108 S. Ct. 2260, 2267 (1988).
Full-time practice requirements may be more open to challenge. See id. (office requirement
is "fully adequate to protect whatever interest the State might have in full-time practice
restriction") (emphasis added); see also Helminski v. Supreme Court of Colo., 603 F. Supp.
401, 407 (D. Colo. 1985) (local office requirement preferred alternative to residency).
150. VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:1(3).
151. See, e.g., Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173, 178 & n.6 (N.D. Ala. 1981)
(mem.); Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1360 (E.D.N.C. 1970);
Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440, 445 (W. Va. 1982).
152. The current process for investigating background and moral character of exam appli-
cants is cursory. The process should be intensified if moral character standards are to have
any true meaning and effect. See Comment, The Investigation of Good Moral Character for
Admission to the Virginia Bar-Time for a Change, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 601, 610-12, 617
(1985).
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keep up to date on state law and courtroom procedures. 153 Virginia re-
quires CLE 154 and could afford to increase the post-licensing education
burden.
The Commonwealth imposes the lightest CLE burden of any state with
CLE mandates. 155 Virginia's requirements are also not as specific as those
in other states. South Carolina, for example, requires eleven "trial exper-
iences" before an attorney may appear in court alone. 56 For non-lawyer
applicants, Virginia could also join the minority of states requiring skills
training courses during law school.15 7
3. Disciplinary Procedures and Jurisdiction
Post-admission sanctions may prove better deterrents to improper legal
practice than pre-admission investigations and testing.'58 Concerns that
nonresident attorneys would not comply with bar disciplinary proceed-
ings are unwarranted. 59
An office requirement alone ensures that Virginia bar inquiries and
courts have jurisdiction over nonresident attorneys. Yet even this require-
ment has its limitations. First, as previously noted, such a requirement is
itself open to constitutional attack, if it forces nonresident attorneys to
do what residents need not do. 6 ° Second, to the extent the Virginia bar
153. E.g., Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260, 2266-67 (1988); Helminski
v. Supreme Court of Colo., 603 F. Supp. 401, 407 (D. Colo. 1985).
154. VA. Sup. CT. R., pt. 6, § IV, para. 17.
155. Virginia requires eight hours per year of CLE, compared to an average of 13.5 and a
high of 20. See 1988 ABA GUIDE, supra note 27, at 40-41.
156. S.C. R. FOR EXAMINATION & ADMISSION OF PERSONS TO PRACTICE L. 5B.
157. As of 1988, ten states had such requirements. See 1988 A.BA GUIDE, supra note 27,
at 10-11.
158. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 167
(1971); Rhode, supra note 29, at 590 ("[R]esources now consumed in predicting professional
misconduct would be better expended in detecting, deterring and redressing it.").
159. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 286 & n.20 (1985).
160. See supra note 149; cf. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona
agricultural regulation requiring grower to build packing facilities in state, rather than use
nearby California plant, held to violate commerce clause of the Constitution).
The principal argument against the constitutionality of office or full-time practice require-
ments is that less restrictive alternatives exist. If the asserted purpose of such requirements
is to ensure adequate legal skill, then continuing legal education or an initial attorney's
exam in court rules and procedure, for example, are proper substitutes. See supra note 144.
If the asserted purpose is to ensure availability for court appearances and disciplinary pro-
cedures, affiliation with local counsel and designation of the Virginia Supreme Court clerk
as agent for service of process are sound options. See infra notes 161-66 and accompanying
text.
The less restrictive means analysis is not dispositive, however, and continuing practice or
office requirements would likely survive judicial scrutiny. See Note, A Constitutional Anal-
ysis of State Bar Residency Requirements, supra note 8, at 1489; see also Aronson v. Am-
brose, 479 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.) (Virgin Islands rule conditioning bar admission on intent to
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wants to discourage outside competition, an office requirement may be
the wrong thing to do. An out-of-state competitor with an office across
the street is logically a more dangerous foe than one without local pres-
ence. Further, an office requirement may prove redundant. As the Su-
preme Court noted, a lawyer who is willing to pay initial application fees
and annual dues, and comply with continuing legal education and other
regular requirements, is naturally likely to maintain an active practice in
the state, and an office in or near the state."' 1 Even if that requirement
were waived, most lawyers practicing in Virginia would be subject to the
general "long-arm" jurisdiction of the Virginia courts.1 12
Other states also require nonresident attorneys to designate the clerk of
the high court, or some resident attorney, as an agent for service of pro-
cess. 6 3 This type of jurisdictional tactic is not foreign to Virginia law. A
similar service requirement is already made of attorneys admitted pro
hac vice into Virginia courts.' Virginia also designates a state official as
the service agent for nonresident motor vehicle operators.16
5
Finally, according to the Court's proposal in Piper, state courts could,
by rule or discretion, require lawyers residing far from court to retain a
local attorney, who would attend unscheduled meetings and hearings
which the distant lawyer could not. 6
V. CONCLUSION
The elimination of residency requirements challenges the ability of
state bars to regulate the conduct of their members. The challenge may
be met, however, in ways which foster healthy competition among all law-
yers, without regard to state boundaries. In Virginia, this kind of compe-
tition should be welcomed, not discouraged.16 7
continue to reside in and practice in territory upheld against equal protection clause chal-
lenge), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973). As a practical matter, federal courts may be more
reluctant in the post-Friedman era to eliminate more defendable efforts by state bars to
operate independently.
161. See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 285 (1985).
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1 (Cum. Supp. 1988).
163. E.g., U.S. DIST. CT. R. 701. The comment to the rule calls this provision "[t]he most
significant change" to court rules, and states it was added "to eliminate service problems as
part of an overall effort to simplify the Court's disciplinary procedures." Id. at comment.
164. VA. Sup. CT. R 1A:4.
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-308 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
166. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 287 (1985). However, because the
critical factor would be distance from the courthouse, not whether the counselor resides in
the state, such a system could create a peculiar situation; imagine thousands of D.C. and
Maryland attorneys practicing uninhibited in Alexandria courts, while Richmond attorneys
are forced to retain local association with their northern Virginia colleagues.
167. Although the national population of lawyers grows steadily, the 735:1 persons-per-
lawyer ratio in Virginia lags far behind the 418:1 national average. See LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT, supra note 46, at 65, 207.
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The Commonwealth presently uses several of the methods prescribed
by courts and commentators for ensuring the competency of nonresident
lawyers. Specifically, it requires: CLE; a National Conference of Bar Ex-
aminers report on past conduct and practice; and a Virginia law office and
full-time practice. Virginia should follow the example of other states by
increasing its annual education requirements for attorneys, and tailoring
such requirements according to the perceived shortcomings of most bar
members. Expanded CLE demands should be accompanied by more vig-
orous application of post-admission sanctions against incompetent law-
yers; the strictest bar entry requirements mean little if existing members
may forever retain their status, despite ineffective or unethical practice.
If these steps are taken, Virginia's in-state office and full-time practice
requirements should be reconsidered. Although such demands are proba-
bly constitutional, they offer nominal benefits to the legitimate interests
of the Virginia bar. These same benefits would be fully realized by
amending CLE standards, requiring a comprehensive examination of Vir-
ginia rules and procedure, or appointing a state agent to receive service of
process for nonresident attorneys. The needs of Virginia citizens and law-
yers are best met not by eliminating admission on motion, but by modify-
ing and supplementing existing restrictions.
Paul G. Gill
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APPENDIX*
*The chart below summarizes data from the most recent statutory and
rules compilations available to the author. The information charted re-
lates to the existence of residency requirements for exam takers and at-
torney applicants applying on motion, where applicable. The applicability
of reciprocity provisions, limiting admission on motion to attorneys from
states which grant the same privilege, is also noted. The last column indi-
cates whether the jurisdiction requires nonresidents to designate an in-
state agent for service of process or maintain an office within the state.
The accompanying footnotes, numbered consecutively as 1A, 2A, etc., ex--
plain the subtleties of each state's admission requirements found in the
rules and statutes.
Residency Motion Residency
State for Exam Available Reciprocity for Motion Svc./Office
(Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Specify)
Ala. No No N/A N/A No
Alaska'A No Yes Yes N/A No
Ariz. No No N/A N/A No
Ark.2A No No N/A N/A No
Cal.3 A No Yes No No No
Colo.A No Yes No No No
Conn1A No Yes No No No
IA. Noll v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 649 P.2d 241 (Alaska 1982) (overruled former Bar Rule
5(1)(a) requirement of simple residency at time of admission); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n,
620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980) (removed 30-day durational residency requirement of former
Bar Rule 2(1)(e)).
2A. The former rule allowing reciprocal admission on motion, Ark. R. Governing Admis-
sion to the Bar XI, was eliminated by order of the Arkansas Supreme Court of July 1, 1985.
See Publisher's Notes, ARK. R. GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR XI.
3A. Attorney applicants licensed and "actively, substantially and lawfully engaged in the
practice of law" in an American jurisdiction for four of six years preceding examination may
join the California bar by taking a limited attorneys' examination. See CAL. R. REGULATING
ADMISSION TO PRACTICE L. II, IV § 41(2)(a), XII.
4A. Compare COLO. R. Civ. P. 201.3(1) (exam waived for attorney applicants with active
practice in five of past seven years, or scaled score of 152 or better on Multistate Bar Exami-
nation within last two years, provided moral fitness and educational requirements are met)
with COLO. R. CIv. P. 202, 7A COLO. REV. STAT. (1973) (repealed Nov. 10, 1982) (imposing
measure-for-measure reciprocity requirements).
5A. The state allows admission by motion for attorney applicant with five years good
standing in another jurisdiction, good moral character, and passing score on the Multistate
Professional Responsibility Examination (MPRE), who "intends ... to devote the major
portion of his or her working time to the practice of law in Connecticut." CONN. SUPER. #CT.
R. 21. A former statutory provision mandating residency was repealed in 1963. See CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-82 (West 1985).
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Residency Motion Residency
State for Exam Available Reciprocity for Motion Svc./Office
(Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Specify)
Del6A No No N/A N/A No
D.C.7 A No Yes No No Svc.
Fla. No No N/A N/A No
Ga. No No N/A N/A No
Haw8A No No N/A N/A No
Idaho9A No No N/A N/A No
- Ill.1 °A No Yes Yes Yes No
Ind.11A No Yes No Yes Both
Iowa 2 A Yes No N/A N/A Svc.
Kan.SA Yes Yes No Yes No
6A. Former Del. Sup. Ct. R. 53 allowing admission on motion was repealed effective Feb.
21, 1984. See DEL. CODE ANN. (Rules Repl. Vol. 1987).
7A. D.C. CT. App. R. 46(c) (allows admission by motion provided applicant pays for a Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBE) investigation, proves good moral character, has
five years good standing elsewhere, a law degree and a proper multistate bar exam score).
All attorneys admitted to the U.S. District Court must also designate the clerk of court as
agent for service of process. U.S. DIsT. CT. R. 701.
8A. See Potts v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Hawaii, 332 F. Supp. 1392
(D. Haw. 1971) (invalidating on equal protection grounds the requirement of six months
physical residency in state sometime after age 15).
9A. IDAHO CODE § 3-101 (Cum. Supp. 1988) was amended in 1985 to remove Idaho's for-
mer requirements of United States citizenship and state residency.
10A. Attorney applicant seeking admission on motion must meet higher of qualifications
for Illinois or those seeking admission without exam in states where applicant is licensed,
and all such jurisdictions must offer reciprocal admission on motion. ILL. SuP. CT. R. 705(b).
They must also demonstrate actual residency. Id. R. 705(d).
11A. Exam applicants must certify they will actively engage in Indiana law practice
within two years of admission. IND. AD. R. 13. Nonresidents must additionally either: main-
tain an in-state office; affiliate with Indiana bar members with Indiana offices; or be em-
ployed full-time by established state businesses or government organizations. Id. Rule 6 fur-
ther requires attorney applicants seeking exam waiver to show bona-fide Indiana residency,
active practice in at least five of the last seven years, and persuade the admissions board
that their admission is "in the public interest." Id. R. 6.
12A. All applicants must be state inhabitants, state a bona fide intention to become Iowa
residents upon admission, or demonstrate bona fide intention to practice law in Iowa. Those
relying only on an intention to practice law must also designate the clerk of the supreme
court as agent for service of process. Rule 40 IOWA CODE ANN. § 602 app. A, Rule 105 (West
1988).
13A. Exam waived for attorney applicants seeking a "temporary permit," but only upon a
showing that applicant "is or will become a bona fide resident." KAN. SUP. CT. R. 706(a)(4).
Applicants by examination must show residency. Id. R. 702. Contra 1986 A.BA. GumE,
supra note 24, at 2-3.
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Residency Motion Residency
State for Exam Available Reciprocity for Motion Svc./Office
(Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Specify)
Ky.14 A No Yes Yes No No
La. No No N/A N/A No
Me. No No N/A N/A No
Md.15A No Yes No No No
Mass.16 A No Yes No No No
Mich.17 A No Yes Yes No No
Minn.18A No Yes No No Either
Miss. 19 A No Yes Yes Yes No
Mo.Z °A No Yes Yes No Office
Mont. 1A Yes Yes No Yes No
Neb. No No N/A N/A No
Nev. No No N/A N/A No
N.H. No No N/A N/A No
14A. Kentucky allows admission on motion if applicant demonstrates an intent to prac-
tice, and proves that jurisdictions where he or she is licensed have comparable admission
and comity requirements. KY. Sup. CT. R. 2.110. Nonresident lawyers may also apply for a
limited practice certificate if they are employed full time by firms doing business in Ken-
tucky. Id. R. 2.111.
15A. Attorneys with five years active practice out of the last seven, as lawyer, law profes-
sor or judge, may join the bar upon passing an "out-of-state attorney exam." MD. R. Gov-
ERNING ADMISSION TO BAR 14 (a)(i).
16A. Attorney applicants must pass the MPRE and "a limited written examination in
Massachusetts practice and procedure." MASS. Sup. JuD. CT. R. 3:01, § 6.1.6. The same stan-
dards apply to attorneys licensed in foreign countries, with the addition of a "principal resi-
dence" in Massachusetts requirement. Id. § 6.2.1.
17A. Attorney applicants are admitted on motion contingent on Michigan residency, un-
less the jurisdiction they are applying from does not require residency. MIcH. R. FOR BD. L.
EXAMINERS 5(a)(4).
18A. Minnesota requires all bar applicants meet one of the following requirements: resi-
dency; office in state; or designation of appellate court clerk as agent for service of process
for all purposes. MINN. R. FOR ADMISSION TO BAR 11(B). Attorney applicants must meet gen-
eral requirements, have practiced actively in five of the prior seven years, and never failed
the Minnesota bar examination. Id. R. VIII(D).
19A. Reciprocal admission by motion is available for certain attorney applicants, condi-
tioned on residency and a certified intention to establish a permanent law office in Missis-
sippi within 30 days of admission, plus the satisfactory completion of an "attorney's exami-
nation." R. GOVERNING ADMISSION TO Miss. STATE BAR VI, § 1.
20A. Admission on motion requires applicant to maintain or be employed in a full-time
law office in Missouri. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 8.10(e).
21A. Statutory provisions support the listings in this chart. See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1-
402, 37-61-202, -208 (1987). The American Bar Association suggests otherwise. See A.BA
GumE, supra note 24, at 2 (no residence requirement for admission by exam).
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Residency Motion Residency
State for Exam Available Reciprocity for Motion Svc./Office
(Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Specify)
N.J.22A No No N/A N/A Both
N.M. 23A Yes No N/A N/A No
N.Y. 24 A No Yes Yes No Svc.
N.C.2 5A No Yes Yes No No
N.D.26 A No Yes No No Svc.
Ohio No Yes No Yes No
Okla. "A No Yes Yes No No
Or. 2SA No No N/A N/A Svc.
Pa.29A No Yes Yes No No
R.I.30A No Yes No Yes No
S.C. No No N/A N/A No
22A. All active bar members must maintain an office in state. Nonresident members des-
ignate the supreme court clerk as agent for service of process for all activities, including
disciplinary actions. N.J. CT. R. 1:21-1(a).
23A. State effectively requires residency for out-of-state applicants who are not attorneys.
See N.M. Sup. CT. R. 15-103(B) (nonresident exam applicants must show active practice for
at least four of six years preceding application).
24A. All attorney applicants designate the clerk of the appellate division as agent for
service of process. N.Y. CT. R. § 520.11.
25A. MPRE only exam requirement for motion, provided jurisdiction where applicant li-
censed provides similar privilege. N.C.R. GOVERNING ADMISSION TO PRACTICE OF L. § .0502.
26A. All bar applicants must designate supreme court clerk as agent for service of pro-
cess. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-11-01, Rule 1(A)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1987). Exam waived for appli-
cants with five years bar status elsewhere, active practice four of last five years; Board of
Examiners may require attorney's exam, if unsatisfied about attorney applicant's compe-
tency. Id. Rule 4(D).
27A. Admission by motion contingent on reciprocity, and applicant paying for NCBE in-
vestigative report. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, app. 5, R. 2 § 3, § 5 (West Cum. Supp. 1989). If
reciprocal state's admission standards are "more stringent and exacting" than Oklahoma's,
and the fees it requires are higher, such standards and fees apply to the applicant. Id. § 5.
Certain temporary law practice permits and corporate counsel activities of those not in the
Oklahoma bar are permitted. Id. §§ 6, 7.
28A. Nonresidents must designate a "resident active member of the Oregon State Bar" as
in-state agent for service of process. OR. R. REGULATING ADIISSION TO PRACTICE L. 1.10(2).
All applicants must pass state bar exam. Id. R. 2.25.
29A. Reciprocity must be by specific agreement with other states. PA. BAR ADMISSION R.
204.
30A. Qualified attorney applicants may get a one year temporary permit without exami-
nation; they may apply within 30-60 days of the permit's expiration for permanent bar
standing, which shall be granted if the bar finds the applicant "since the issuance of the
temporary license, has resided in this state and made the practice of law in this state his
principal occupation and intends to continue to so reside and practice and that all other
qualifications remain satisfactory." R.I. Sup. CT. R. 34(d). Two-year temporary permits are
allowed for legal aid practitioners. Id. R. 34(e). Rule 42-1 asserts court jurisdiction in disci-
plinary matters over all specially- and fully-admitted practitioners. Id. R. 42-1.
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Residency Motion Residency
State for Exam Available Reciprocity for Motion Svc./Office
(Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Yes or No) (Specify)
S.D.3 1 A No No N/A N/A Either
Tenn. A No Yes No No No
Tex 3 A No Yes No No No
Utah No No N/A N/A No
Vt 4A No Yes No No No
Va.35A No Yes Yes Yes Office
Wash.3 6A No No N/A N/A Svc.
W.Va. No Yes Yes No No
Wis. No Yes No No No
Wyo.3 7A Yes Yes No Yes No
31A. Code requires residency, or office in state, or designation of supreme court clerk as
agent for service of process. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 16-16-2 (1987). The residency re-
quirement has been unenforced since 1982. See Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Exam-
iners, 530 F.Supp. 155 (D.S.D. 1982) (mem.).
32A. Attorney applicants must have passed admission requirements similar to the general
Tennessee standards, in the state where they are licensed. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 7 § 5.02.
33A. Attorney applicants from jurisdictions whose admission standards are not equivalent
to or do not exceed those of Texas may be required to take the examination. TEY Gov'T
CODE ANN. § 82.036(b) (Vernon 1988).
34A. Attorney applicants are admitted on motion if they practiced five of the last 10
years; requirement drops to three years if any jurisdiction where applicant is licensed re-
quires fewer than five years experience for admission by motion applicants. R. OF ADMISSION
TO BAR OF VT. SUP. CT. § 7(a). Attorney applicants must study three months in a Vermont
law office, under the supervision of a Vermont bar member who has had at least three years
experience. Id. § 7(d).
35A. The permanent residency requirement of VA. Sup. CT. R. 1A:1, for reciprocal admis-
sion on motion, was voided in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 108 S. Ct. 2260, 2267
(1988). The Supreme Court of Virginia has not yet revised the rule, which also requires the
attorney applicant to furnish a NCBE investigative report, practice law full time in Virginia
and maintain an office in the state. See Elkins, U.S. Supreme Court Voids Virginia's Resi-
dency Rule, 3 VA. LAW. WEEKLY 1 (June 27, 1988).
36A. Nonresident bar members designate an in-state agent for service of process. WASH.
A.P.R. 5(e).
37A. Every applicant, by motion or exam, must establish residency for six months prior
to admission. Wyo. Sup. CT. R. 5(c).

